1. Deployment-Level Data. This takes the deployment as the unit of analysis allowing for a descriptive inquiry into why and how SWAT teams are deployed ( Table 1 in the main text).
2. ZCTA-Level Data, All Md. This takes the zip code tabulation area (ZCTA) as the unit of analysis, and allows for an inquiry into the geographic correlates of SWAT deployments. The postal code SWAT data was merged with ZCTA-level U.S. Census demographic data from the 2013 American Community Survey (16) (17) (18) (19) using a ZCTA/zipcode crosswalk file published online by the UDS Mapper project (info here: https://www.udsmapper.org/about.cfm; n ≈ 470 zip-codes). (see Figure 1 in the main text and Figure S2 below).
3. ZCTA-Level Data, Large Md. Jurisdictions. Generates the same data structure as 2. but for Baltimore City , Prince George's County and Montgomery County Police Depts. These agencies post incident-level, geocoded crime data (longitude and latitude) online (see here: https://data.baltimorecity.gov/Public-Safety/BPD-Part-1-Victim-Based-Crime-Data/wsfq-mvij/data; https://data.princegeorgescountymd.gov/login; https://data.montgomerycountymd.gov/Public-Safety/Crime/icn6-v9z3/data). I used census shape files to map crimes to ZCTAs. The crime data obtained from Baltimore, Prince George's County and Montgomery County Maryland were not uniformly coded, so it was necessary to classify violent crimes in the data. The FBI classifies murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery and assault as violent crimes. In the Baltimore data, crimes took on 15 distinct categorical values. I coded any crime event containing the FBI terms, as well as the word "shooting," as a violent crime. In the Prince George's County data, where crimes were coded into 21 categories, I used the same technique. The crime categories in the Montgomery County data took over 300 distinct values. I hand coded these as violent or not based on the FBI definitions, and also counted events with terms like "simple assault," "bomb threat" and "explosive device" as violent crimes. In addition, the Montgomery County web site noted that single rows in the data could represent multiple offenses, but did not specify which rows, so they are assumed to be single incidents by necessity. The data from all three sources are periodically refreshed and do not extend back in time indefinitely, but I downloaded versions of these incident-level data sets in late 2015 and early 2016 that contained data from Baltimore ranging from 2011-2016; data from Prince George's County from Jan. 1, 2011-December 24, 2015; and data from Montgomery County that ranged from July 1, 2013-December 31, 2015. Data from all crime data sets were trimmed to overlap with the Maryland SWAT data in time, which covers FY2010-2014, though the Montgomery crime data could not be paired in the earliest years. These three agencies represent three of the top five largest agencies in the state in terms of total full-time sworn officers according to the 2008 CSLLEA.
5. County-Level Data. Allows for a replication of the ZCTA-level analysis in Figure 1 using (20) (21) (22) (23) and the Maryland SWAT data merged with U.S. Census data on counties (24-27).
6. Agency-Month Data. Allows for a panel analysis of the effects of deployments on crime and officer safety ( Figure 3) ; merges in the FBI crime data and LEOKA data on officers killed and assaulted (see Figure 3 in main text). As with the nationwide panel, agencies which report crime and officer safety data to the FBI as a group were excluded. The Maryland State Police were also excluded since their various substations' crime and officer safety data could not be paired with the SWAT data. Finally, agency-months in which an agency did not report data on officers assaulted in the LEOKA data are excluded from estimation of models of assaults on officers. This means some of the agency-month analyses use unbalanced panels (not all agencies are observed in the same number of time periods). It is possible agencies did not report assaults on officers in these months because none occurred. See Table S34 for a robustness check treating unreported agency-month assault data as zero assaults, which leads to similar results.
E. Crime Data.
For the core analysis in Figure 2 , I sum violent crimes over the 12-month periods specified above corresponding to the 2000, 2004 and 2008 CSLLEA surveys using the FBI's agency-month level crime data (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) . I merged these data with the CSLLEA using a common agency identifier ("Originating Agency Identification" (ORI7) numbers). The 2008 CSLLEA included an ORI number which I then appended to the the 2004 and 2000 waves after matching agencies across waves using the procedure described above. The same crime data were merged with the Maryland SWAT data by agency and month to generate Figure 3 .
F. LEOKA Data. The FBI Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) database contains incident-level records on police officers killed or injured in the line of duty. After summing incidents of felonious killings, accidental killings, and assaults over the appropriate 12-month periods, the LEOKA data were merged with the 2000, 2004 and 2008 CSLLEA by a standardized agency identifier (ORI number), and with the Maryland SWAT data by agency and month (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) .
G. SWAT Analysis: Model Specifications.
The results of models explaining violent crime and officer safety using the national and Maryland SWAT panels in the main text are estimated via the following ordinary least squares model specifications:
log(Outcomei,t + 1) = τ SW AT i,t + θi + γt + i,t [1] log(Outcomei,t + 1) = τ SW AT i,t + θi + γt + βiAgencyi · time + i,t [2] where the Outcomei,t is a count of the number of violent crimes or officer killings/assaults that occurred in a unit (agency) i in a time period (year for national panel; year-month for Maryland panel) t, SWATi,t is an indicator for having a SWAT team for a given agency and year in the national panel, and the logged number of SWAT deployments in a month-year in the Maryland panel (i.e. log(#Deployments + 1)), θi and γt are agency and period-specific fixed effects, respectively, and i,t is an error term. All outcomes for results in the main text are specified as log(Outcomei,t + 1) to reduce the influence of extreme values, but results using alternative specifications of the outcome appear below.
Equation (1) is the generalized difference-in-differences (DID) model and Equation ( 2) adds agency-specific linear time trends, where time is a continuous variable ranging from the minimum to the maximum number of the periods, and Agencyi is an indicator for an observation belonging to one of J agencies. The second model imposes a different safeguard against endogeneity, since agency-specific linear time trends help correct for the possibility that agencies were not trending in parallel over time. However, this safeguard comes at a cost-precision-since Model 2 trades away degrees of freedom due to the additional parameters requiring estimation.
The quantity of interest in each case is τ , which represents the average change in the outcome for a one-unit increase in the treatment, (i.e., obtaining or deploying a SWAT team), within agencies over time, net of common time shocks/trends. Both models provide causal leverage by making comparisons within agencies over time rather than attempting to control for the many unobservable differences between agencies (58) .
In addition to these core specifications, Tables S12-S34 display the results of tests for lagged effects and for specification errors using various alternative codings of the outcomes and weighting schemes. The pattern of results across these alternate specifications remains highly similar to those reported in the core results.
Given the thousands of parameters being estimated in these models, standard regression packages in R and STATA proved computationally inadequate to compute the correct standard errors. As an alternative, coefficients and standard errors for the national SWAT panel analysis were estimated using an agency-blocked bootstrap (59) with 1,500 iterations per model. The procedure is as follows. Consider a data set with k agencies. To start, k agencies (all of their respective observations) are randomly resampled from the data with replacement. The treatment effect is estimated on this bootstrapped sample, the coefficient is stored, and the process is repeated 1,500 times. The mean of these bootstrapped estimates serves as the point estimate and the 2.5th and 97.5th quantiles of this distribution of estimates serve as the bounds of the 95% confidence interval. This procedure simulates the data generating process of error clustering by agency while relaxing parametric assumptions about uncertainty (such as Normal errors). Standard regression software packages were used to estimate coefficients and agency-clustered standard errors with the much smaller Maryland panel.
H. Survey Experimental Design. The M-Turk survey was conducted September-October 2015. The SSI survey was conducted in March 2016. The M-Turk survey consists of a convenience sample of adult volunteers. The SSI survey was quota-targeted to match the U.S. Census in terms of age race and gender, and also included an oversample of 1,849 African-American respondents who were targeted to match Census figures on age and gender. See Table S8 for demographics of samples.
I. Sources of Image Manipulations.
The control image of Boston police officers in traditional blue uniforms appeared in (60) . The original source was listed as Jessica Rinaldi/Reuters. The "riot gear" image portrays an image of police in Portland during a protest wearing heavy armor and equipped with batons and face shields, and appeared in (61) . The same image was located on Shutterstock.com, a stock photo warehouse, where a high-resolution version was purchased. The photo is credited to JPL Designs. The "assault rifles" image accompanied (62) and portrays officers deployed in Ferguson, MO in body armor with rifles. The photo was credited to Jeff Roberson of the Associated Press. The "armored vehicle" image also portrays officers deployed in Ferguson, MO and, in addition to SWAT team members, includes a mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle (MRAP). This image accompanied (63) . The image was credited to Whitney Curtis/The New York Times and was purchased for reprinting from Redux Pictures.
J. Survey Experiments: Model Specifications.
In the M-Turk survey, treatment assignment was globally randomized. In the SSI survey, treatment assignment was blocked by the race of the respondent, but treatment assignment probabilities were constant across blocks (i.e., treatment assignment is uncorrelated with block status). Indicators for blocks are included as covariates during estimation for the SSI survey in order to increase efficiency (64) . The model estimating treatment effects is:
where Image j are indicators for each of the militarized treatment images (with the control image serving as a reference category) and Race i,k are indicators for each racial category of respondents (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic, with "non-Hispanic white" serving as a reference category.) All models use robust (HC1) standard errors (65) .
To estimate differences in treatment effects between Black and white respondents, Equation 4 was re-estimated with the addition of interaction between treatment indicators and indicators for respondent race (see Equation 5 below). The coefficient τj below represents the treatment effect of a given image j among white respondents (the omitted category). The quantity τj + γ j,k represents the treatment effect of image j for racial group k. Finally, γ j,k represents the difference in treatment effects between racial group k and white respondents. These quantities are displayed in 6 in the main text for non-Hispanic white and African American respondents.
Figure S9 displays treatment effects after re-weighting the data to be nationally representative in terms of race, gender and party based on the proportions in population-weighted 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (66) . The results are highly similar.
K. Balance on Observables. OLS models in Table S11 predict treatment assignment in the SSI and M-Turk surveys as a function of respondent demographics. The F statistic and accompanying p-value at the bottom of each model correspond to the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly zero, which should be true if balance was achieved through random assignment. As the table shows, no p-value on any F -statistic allows us to reject this null (i.e., p > .05), indicating that the randomization was successful. The chief of the city police department requested a 7 percent budget increase for his agency at Thursday's City Council meeting, arguing that additional officers are needed in light of recent personnel changes.
L. Text of Experimental News
According to the police chief, retirements and promotions in the police department made it necessary to hire additional officers in 2014. This led to an increase in costs associated with officer training and implementation.
The council is expected to vote on a final budget some time next month.
M. Question Wording, M-turk Survey. Respondents were not initially told that the article was fictitious, but were fully debriefed at the end of the survey. To help ensure receipt of the treatment, the article appeared on the screen for 30 seconds before respondents were allowed to advance in the survey. Following the news article, the following questions were asked to measure outcomes. The chief of the city police department requested a 7 percent budget increase for his agency at Thursday's City Council meeting, arguing that additional funds are necessary in light of recent personnel changes.
Crime in vignette city
According to the police chief, retirements and promotions last year mean the department will need to hire additional officers to serve the city, which has roughly 200,000 residents. The additional funds will be used for training, equipment and salaries, the chief said.
The council is expected to vote on a final budget later this year. P. Changes between the M-Turk and SSI Surveys. The M-turk survey included several dependent variables pertaining to trust in government institutions and support for punitive policy that were not repeated in the SSI survey. The estimated treatment effects on these omitted outcomes are displayed in Figure S8 . In addition, the SSI survey added items gauging perceived changes in crime within the vignette city, perceived fairness in treatment by police, and support for police patrols in respondents' own neighborhoods. The SSI survey also included an attention screen at the start of the survey which screened out respondents who were unable to correctly use a sliding bar scale, a measurement tool used by other researchers who were sharing space on the survey instrument. The police experiment appeared first in the survey before the other researchers' content. In the M-Turk survey, the prompts for the open-ended questions stated, "you may answer in one sentence or less." This was omitted in the SSI survey in order to encourage more complete responses. In addition, the font size of the text of the mock news article was made larger in the SSI survey than in the M-turk survey to make it easier to read.
Demographic items were measured at the end of the M-Turk survey, but were measured at the start of the SSI survey in order to accommodate another experiment that was included in the same module by other researchers. The SSI survey also fully randomized the order of all questions measuring dependent variables, while the M-turk survey listed questions pertaining to the vignette city, including perceived crime in that city, immediately following the mock news article.
Additional Analysis and Robustness Checks
This section describes several additional tests that were conducted to gauge the robustness of the core results for the crime and officer safety analysis presented in the main text. Figure S2 displays the relationships between the volume of deployments in a given Maryland zip-code (logged and adjusted for population size) and various social indicators. As the figure shows, zip-codes with higher shares of non-Hispanic Black residents, and lower shares of non-Hispanic white residents, tend to see more SWAT team deployments per capita, while SWAT deployments appear to have nonlinear relationships with the %Non-Hispanic White, %Non-Hispanic Asian, % with a B.A. and median household income in a ZCTA.
A. Demographics of SWAT Deployments in MD.
B. The Parallel Trends Assumption. Differences-in-differences models identify causal effects given a parallel trends assumption, which states that outcomes in the treatment and control groups would have trended in parallel over time but for the treatment (58) . A common robustness check of this assumption involves examining pre-treatment trends across groups. If groups are not trending in parallel prior to the treatment, there is good reason to suspect that the parallel trends assumption is violated. In this case, an example of this violation would be if agencies where crime was worsening adopted SWAT teams at differential rates compared with agencies where crime was stable.
To test for this possibility, I conduct additional placebo tests that add "lead" treatment indicators-which measure an agency's SWAT status one time period in the future-to the DID models in both the national and Maryland panels (see Equation 3 below). If selection bias of this sort is not a problem, we should not be able to predict contemporaneous violent crime and officer safety levels with the future SWAT status of an agency.
Figures S3 and S4 display the results of these placebo tests in the national and Maryland SWAT panels, respectively. All "lead" effects are indiscernible from zero (statistically insignificant). There is no indication from this test that endogenous selection into adopting SWAT teams is producing these null results.
One plausible reason why the parallel trends assumption appears to hold in these data is that militarized policing has become a routine facet of local law enforcement (68) (69) (70) . Local agencies are adopting militarized police units as a matter of course under the assumptions that these tactics help protect police officers and deter crime, but not necessarily as a response to changes in conditions. C. Measurement Error and Influential Observations. As previous scholars have noted, FBI data on crime often contains error. Prior work has developed procedures for identifying values likely to be erroneous (71) , such as observations which substantially deviate from an agency's average value. The problem with this strategy is that it is difficult to tell whether an observation is truly erroneous or simply an outlier.
I took several alternative measures to gauge the robustness of results to data errors, summarized below.
1. Iteratively dropping agencies. I reanalyzed the data after iteratively dropping agencies from the data to test whether results were being driven by deviant observations. In one analysis, I iteratively drop each agency from the national and Maryland SWAT panels, reestimate effects on crime and officer safety, and store results. In another, I iteratively drop five random agencies from the national SWAT panel (10,000 iterations) and do the same. If extreme values due to measurement error are driving results, we should see a large variance in the resulting distribution of estimates. Figures S5-S7 display the results of this sensitivity analysis. The grey bars in the histograms correspond to the "leave one out" analysis and the pink bars correspond to the "leave five out" analysis. The results show no indication that a small number of discrepant agencies are driving results. In general these distributions of estimates are concentrated around the treatment effects reported in the main text.
2. Dropping agencies with "zero" violent crimes. An additional robustness check appears Tables S19 and S30 . This analysis drops all agencies from the data which report zero violent crimes in at least one year in the national panel, or go a whole year without reporting a violent crime int he agency-month Maryland panel. The reasoning behind this test is that, in the FBI UCR data, the value of zero is listed for agencies who either did not report any crimes or that actually experienced zero crimes. Dropping these cases can therefore serve as another check that measurement error is not driving results. As the results show, dropping these agencies leads to a similar pattern of results, and no statistically significant negative estimates are recovered, i.e., the general conclusion that SWAT teams fail to reduce violent crime or enhance officer safety holds.
3. Accounting for underreporting of assaults on officers. The LEOKA monthly data set containing officer safety outcomes indicates whether an agency failed to report assaults in a given month. In the national panel analysis, where the agency-year is the unit of observation, I conduct a robustness check that weights all regression results by the proportion of months per agency in each wave of the CSLLEA that have complete assault data. The results appear in Table S22 . The results still show no support for the claims that the acquisition of SWAT teams or SWAT deployments reduce violent crime or promote officer safety. In the Maryland panel analysis, where the agency-month is the unit of observation, I only use agency-months where assaults were reported in the core analyses. However, it is possible agencies did not report assaults on officers in these months because none occurred. See Table S34 for a robustness check treating unreported agency-month assault data as zero assaults, which leads to similar results.
4. Dropping influential observations. I identify influential observations by computing the Cook's Distance for each observation in the core DID models and reestimating those models after dropping agencies with a Cook's Distance greater than
, where n is the number of observations in the data and k is the number of parameters being estimated, (a common rule-of-thumb threshold for identifying influential observations (72)). Tables S21 and S31 show that the core results are largely unchanged after dropping these observations. D. Spillover. Some might worry that the above results in Figure 1 are driven by spillover effects, i.e., jurisdictions with SWAT teams may deploy in neighboring jurisdictions which do not have SWAT teams. This is a common concern in all evaluations of law enforcement tactics, even in randomized controlled trials, since emergency scenarios often lead treatment assignment protocols to be violated in law enforcement studies.
As a robustness check, I reestimate core models after subsetting to only the largest agency (most full-time sworn officers) in each county. Because nearly all SWAT deployments are within-county in the Maryland data, this subset of the data should be largely free of spillover from other SWAT teams in other counties. And because large agencies would be less likely to receive SWAT assistance from smaller agencies in the county than vice versa, this subset should also be largely free of spillover from other agencies within counties. Table S20 displays the results of these tests, which yield conclusions highly similar to the main analysis (i.e., no significant reductions in crime or officer deaths/assaults).
E. Results: Open-Ended Survey Responses.
The responses to open-ended questions concerning why police should get more/less funding can help shed light on the potential mechanisms behind the causal effects reported in the main text. A close reading of a sample of responses suggested that treated respondents cited the militarized gear in the images they saw as justification for funding police less, reasoning that the agency in question must be well-funded already if they have access to such equipment. For example, one respondent in one of the low militarization conditions in the M-Turk sample wrote that the agency's budget should be reduced, " [b] ecause the gear and equipment in the picture looked very expensive and up to date so I think that they could do with less." Another respondent in the SSI high militarization condition wrote, "from the picture, they were buying equipment to fight a war in another country. they are not fighting in the middle east. i think they are wasting money."
It also appeared from the open ended responses that untreated individuals were more likely to cite the department's stated justification for additional funds: that it needed to hire and train officers to make up for retirements and promotions. For example, one respondent in the control condition wrote that police deserved more money because, "Staff turnover is expensive." This suggests that, had the agency in question not deployed militarized police officers, respondents would have been more receptive to the agency's argument to the city council.
In order to systematically test whether these lines of reasoning were more or less prevalent among treated individuals, I conducted a dictionary analysis as follows. I randomly sampled 10% of the pooled SSI and M-Turk open ended responses and developed two dictionaries: one that included words commonly used in answers that noted how militarized the officers appeared, and one containing words common to those who cited personnel issues. The words in these dictionaries, displayed below, as well as the text of the open ended responses, were stemmed, made lowercase, and stripped of punctuation. Words which did not appear more than twice in the sample were discarded. In order to avoid over-fitting, I then discarded these 1,160 responses and computed the proportion of remaining responses across all treatment conditions which contained at least one of these words.
The results are displayed in Figure S10 . The estimates in this figure are consistent with the results of the initial reading above: mentions of words relating to police militarization in the budget open ends are far more common in treated conditions than in the control condition in both the M-Turk and SSI samples. There is also evidence that responses pertaining to the department's stated justification for its budget request-personnel-were more common in the control condition than in treated conditions, though the clearest difference appears between the control and high treatment conditions.
Note: Open-ended responses were also asked about the reasoning behind the perceived levels of crime and text analysis of these responses revealed similar results. The full contents of the dictionaries used to produce Figure S10 , which included corrected versions of words misspelled by respondents, are as follows:
battl gear suit war militar gun arm guard riot equip power militari armi tank milit cloth armor uniform apparel combat swat outfit dress technic rifl artilleri 
D. Sensitivity to Dropping Agencies.
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